Contemporary Issues of Peace and Security in Plateau State, Nigeria: The Traditional and Political Perspectives

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ABSTRACT
This work examines contemporary challenges to peace and security in Plateau State. It argues that the intractable and internecine conflict dynamics reflects a constant clash between the traditional and human conceptions of security. The clash is made possible by Nigeria’s historical experiences in colonial and military dictatorships, which sustained the deployment of military hardware in State responsiveness to every conflict situations. In interpreting these scenarios, the work deploys classical historical, analytical and comparative research methods. The conception of security in post world war era was anchored on the protection and preservation of the State’s territorial integrity, sovereignty and the regime in power. This trend however changes at the end of cold war to the protection and preservation of the national, who now becomes the primary unit of analysis and who is meant to live under socio-economic and political conditions that seek to guarantee the twin values of freedom from fear and freedom from want. It concludes that the zero-sum and militarist-driven approach may fail to address the historical, political, and socio-economic roots of conflict on the Plateau.

Keywords: Peace, Plateau State, traditional security and political security

INTRODUCTION

The challenges of insecurity in Nigeria and Plateau State in particular have continued to occupy and engage scholars not only because of the complex nature of the conflicts, but also of the competing interests that tend to make representations on the causes, dynamics and actors of the conflict intricate. To be sure, these contending interests again seem to accelerate the race to the bottom in finding solution to the crises which unfortunately is also against intervention initiatives to proffering elucidations on the methods to be adopted in the resolution of the crises. These suggestions include the deployment of the military.

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1 The deployment of military in the Plateau conflicts has taken ethno–religious coloration with the Muslims Hausa-Fulani are supportive of a Muslim GOC-Rukuba, State Commissioner of Police, STF Commandant or the Head of the Police College. Conversely, the Christian indigenes are supportive of a Christian occupant to those offices. Therefore, the accusations and calls for or against the posting of these state officials and in the deployment or otherwise of security forces has always been informed by ethno-religious considerations.
panels or commissions of inquiries\(^2\), distribution of relief materials\(^3\), creation of state or local government\(^4\), appointments and elections\(^5\), declaration of state of emergency, granting of indigeneship recognition, etc. As would be appreciated in this work, these interventions do not seek to analyse the causes of the conflicts or the various contending explanations given by the many stakeholders represented in the conflicts, but interrogates the nature of security interventions in the Plateau State conflicts. In underscoring the centrality of security to human existence, Tyoden\(^6\) agrees with the framers of the Nigerian Constitution that indeed the primary consideration for any government is the provision of security. This is because section 14 (2) (a) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria provides that: The security and welfare of the people shall be a primary purpose of government. He further argues on the centrality of security by insisting that government is nationally and internationally under legal obligation to provide security to its nationals. Secondly, he argues that contemporary interpretation of the concept of state sovereignty connotes ‘security responsibility on government’\(^7\) thereby compelling states to act responsibly. With that understanding, he\(^8\) discussed five manifestations of insecurity in Nigeria to include; increased crime rate, increase in illegal arms production and importation of arms and ammunition, upsurge in ethnic, communal and religious conflicts, proliferation of vigilante’s and ethnic and sectional militia, and parlous socio-economic condition of the Nigerian people. Tyoden\(^9\) further argues that the defective security apparatus, ineptitude of government and the culture of violence and militarism are the reasons for the state of insecurity. With this concern, what then is security? Obviously, security is one concept that has received wide attention and currency because of its centrality to human survival. According to the DAC Guidelines on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation, 2001:

Security is increasingly viewed as an all-encompassing condition in which people and communities live in freedom, peace and safety, participate fully in the governance of their countries, enjoy the protection of fundamental rights, have access to resources and basic necessities of life, and inhabit an environment which is not detrimental.

\(^2\) Constitution of Panels of Inquiry have been subject of contestations between the competing interests, with Muslim Hausa/Fulani preferring FG’s interventions, while Christian indigenes going with the state government. A case in point was when FG under President Yar\'Adua inaugurated the Abisoye’s Panel and the State Government inaugurated the Ajibola Panel to look into the November, 2008 conflict.

\(^3\) Obateru, T., ‘Plateau CAN Queries NEMA’s Claim on Displaced Persons’ Vanguard Newspaper, September 28, 2011, (site accessed 16\(^{th}\) October, 2013)


\(^5\) See generally Ostien, Philip, ‘Jonah Jang and the Jasawa: Ethno-Religious Conflict in Jos, Nigeria’ op.cit


\(^7\) Ibid, p. 171

\(^8\) Ibid, pp. 173-182

\(^9\) Ibid, pp. 182-183
to their health and well being. Underpinning this broader understanding is the recognition that the security of people and the security of the state are mutually reinforcing. This perception of security is certainly not in consonance with the ineffaceable inclination to situate security as purely and exclusively in terms of military problematique, where it is thought restrictively and solely along the ‘state of armed readiness, vast, awesome arsenal weaponry’. Therefore, in the word of McNamara:

Security is not military force, though it may involve it, security is not traditional military activity, though it encompasses it, security is not military hardware, though it may include it. Security is development and without development, there can be no security.

This thinking is not actually different from the general reading of Section 14 of the 1999 Nigerian Constitution that requires the Federal Government to ensure that the security and welfare of Nigerians takes a paramount and central stage in all policies and programmes. This indeed echoes the wisdom in the United States declaration of Independence, 1776 which provides, inter alia:

We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their creator with certain unalienable Rights that among these are Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness. That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed.

The problem with the section and other sections under chapter 2 of the 1999 Constitution, in the case of Nigeria, is that Section 6 (6) (c) makes it non-justiciable, when it provides, inter alia:

Shall not, except as otherwise provided by this constitution, extend to any issue or question as to whether any act or omission by any authority or person or as to whether any law or judicial decision is in conformity with the Fundamental Objectives and Directive Principles of State Policy set out in Chapter II of this Constitution;

On whether section 14 and other sections in chapter II are justiciable or not, the argument of Professor Dakas is apt, when he observed that the non-justiciability of Chapter II exposes the paradox and hypocrisy of the Nigerian position. He continues that:

Nigeria is a party to the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights which contains justiciable socio-economic rights. Additionally, consistent with Article 1 of the African Charter under which the States Parties undertook to adopt legislative or other measures to give effect to the provisions of the African Charter Nigeria has, [...] domesticated

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12 Ibid.
the African Charter. Section 1 of the enabling law provides that the provisions of the charter ‘shall have force of law in Nigeria and shall be given full recognition and effect and be applied by all authorities and persons exercising legislative, executive or judicial powers in Nigeria’\textsuperscript{14}.

The point being made is that the conception of security as underscored in the United States Declaration of Independence, 1999 Constitution, and by McNamara has been put in a nutshell in the human security conception. The concept of human security as outlined in the 1994 UNDP report is a people-centred approach, referring to everyday life security concerns. The concept must remain dynamic as the fundamental freedoms needed for a sense of security, what people perceive as the essence of life, vary from society to society\textsuperscript{15}.

Human security is commonly understood as prioritizing the security of people, especially their welfare, safety and wellbeing, rather than that of states. According to the Commission on Human Security, it ‘means protecting fundamental freedoms – freedoms that are the essence of life. It means protecting people from critical (severe) and pervasive (widespread) threats and situations. It means using processes that build on people’s strengths and aspirations. It means creating political, social, environmental, economic, military and cultural systems that together give people the building blocks of survival, livelihood and dignity’\textsuperscript{16}.

Malcolmson’s explanation states that:

\begin{quote}
Human security in its broadest sense embraces far more than the absence of violent conflict. It encompasses Human Rights, good governance, access to education and health care and ensuring that each individual has opportunities and choices to fulfill his or her own potentials. Every step in this direction is also a step towards reducing poverty, achieving economic growth and preventing conflict. Freedom from want, freedom from fear and freedom of future generation to inherit healthy environment. These are the interrelated building blocks of human and therefore national security\textsuperscript{17}.
\end{quote}

This much was expressed by Gambo that “the security of any nation is best guaranteed by utilizing disproportionate amount of its available resources to attain enduring welfare ends of the citizens”\textsuperscript{18}. In a more elaborate explanation of the conception of human security, Dr Kofi Annan observes that:

\begin{quote}
Human security, in its broadest sense, embraces far more than the absence of violent conflict. It encompasses human rights, good
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{14} Ibid, P. 86


\textsuperscript{16} Ibid, Commission on Human Security 2003


governance, access to education and health care and ensuring that
each individual has opportunities and choices to fulfill his or her
potential. Every step in this direction is also a step towards reducing
poverty, achieving economic growth and preventing conflict. Freedom
from want, freedom from fear, and the freedom of future generations
to inherit a healthy natural environment — these are the interrelated
building blocks of human — and therefore national — security.

The 2003 Commission on Human Security Report is very important in the sense that it
came after the 1994 UNDP Report and Annan’s exposé that revived this people-centred
conception of security. In arguing that human security complements state security, the
report identifies four key areas. These are:

i. Its concern is the individual and the community rather than the state.

ii. Menaces to people’s security include threats and conditions that have always
been classified as threats to state security.

iii. That range of actors is expanded beyond the state alone.

iv. Achieving human security includes not just protecting people but also empowering
people to fend for themselves.

Under the human security regime therefore, the duties of state to the people are privileged
over the obligations of the people to the state. Therefore, the burden of classical social-
contract has become glaring now than before when emphasis was placed on protection
against real or perceived intentions of states from external or internal threats. The concern
to which the next section of this work shall turn is to explaining or interrogating the tendency
towards equating security ‘with formidable military buildup.’ Interestingly also, the state
response to conflicts in Plateau State through the deployment of military hardware and or
the over concentration of militarize responses has tended to represent the conflict as being
rooted in aggression against the State and not the nationals.

Issues in the Clash of Security Conceptions in Plateau State
This aims to find explanations for, and examine the trends in the militarized actions in
Plateau conflict. It seeks to achieve this under the following subheadings: the colonial
dimension of the Plateau conflict; the military era dimension of the Plateau conflict and the
three security threats cycles of the Plateau conflict.

The Colonial Dimension of the Plateau Conflict: It is well established that the
peoples of the Plateau have existed in their present abode from time immemorial with
distinct identification. In fact, archaeologists have traced the origin of the people to the
ancient Nok culture civilisation that thrived between 200 BC and 1000 AD. However,
colonialism\(^21\) as an historical epoch set in motion various fundamental changes in Nigeria\(^22\) and Plateau in particular in the sense that these autochthonous peoples had their lives dislodged with the advent of colonialism. In reviewing the colonial dimension of the Plateau conflict, there is need to look at when the trend started, and how and whether colonialism indeed has impacted on the area’s ‘era of purity’\(^{23}\). With regards to the origin of this dislodgement in Plateau State, for instance, the PIDAN Report\(^24\) notes that:

Government first arrived on the Plateau at the end of 1904. The alien population of natives from other parts started their influx at an early date and increased in number as the mining industry was developed. The nomad Fulani, who came later, wandered everywhere and settled nowhere.

When the Plateau Province was formed in 1926, the Jos Native Administration possessed its Treasury, its Goal, a few Courts and a complete set of departmental activities, police, public workers and so on ...

Though this administrative arrangements were intended to be temporal because the native pagans ‘were not sufficiently advanced or experienced to cope with the’ administrative rigours, of the colonialist’s ‘indirect rule policy’\(^25\) will better thrive under the emirate arrangement which were in place amongst the Hausa/Fulanis. To lay credence to this, the colonial reorganisation policy jettisoned the interest of the Plateau native pagans by lumping most of the Plateau polities under the Bauchi province\(^26\) and some under the Zaria province\(^27\). This is because the Emirs in Bauchi and Zaria would provide the desired administrative structures and convenience for effective implementation of indirect rule. In fact, Ballard observes that:

In Berom land, the indigenes came under the direct administration of Political Officers while the mining camps and stranger-settlements which had grown were placed under the native administration headed by the Bunu, a brother of the Emir of Bauchi... These systems survived


\(^{24}\) See PIDAN, op.cit., p. 11-12 where the Gazetter of the Northern Provinces of Nigeria vol. IV (The Highland Chieftaincies), 1934, pages 117-120 was cited in detail.

\(^{25}\) Ibid, p. 12-13


\(^{27}\) Ibid
until the 1940s when the Hausa settlements were absorbed into the system of Berom Native Administration\textsuperscript{28}. In fact, Ochonu\textsuperscript{29} refers to a deliberate colonial policy of politico-cultural uniformity when he insisted that the British came to northern Nigeria desirous of identifying and collaborating with a group of rulers representing a cultural and political entity that they deemed ‘civilised’ and sophisticated enough to be partners in the colonial project\textsuperscript{30}. Therefore, in the case of Plateau State was the balkanisation of the ‘native pagans’ among the neighbouring Hausa/Fulani Emirates that ultimately fits into that design. The implications of these on the security situation in Plateau State are multifaceted particularly as\textsuperscript{31} it laid the foundation for present day ethno-religious acrimony and animosity in Plateau State. Through the instrumentality of colonialism, the Hausa/Fulani oligarchs exercised influence over Plateau area that they could not before the coming of the colonialists. That brief period of influence afforded them the opportunity to not only influence administrative arrangements, but to also tie the socio-economic and politico-cultural conduct of the area to Hausa/Fulani’s sphere of influence in northern Nigeria. It is on this basis that a consideration of the clash of security conceptions on the Plateau is critical in the sense that Plateau State must not be taking in isolation, but thoughtful reflection must be made on challenges to human security in other areas surrounding the State, especially in northern Nigeria and the Sahel region in general.

\textbf{The Military Rule Dimensions of the Plateau Conflict:} The military misadventure into politics in Nigeria has had significant impact on the Plateau conflict not only in its finding solution to the already complex problem engineered by colonialism, but also in further aggravating and complicating the situation. In fact, Professor Elaigwu\textsuperscript{32} observes that ‘if they [military] had come in as political physicians, they had been transformed into patients by Nigeria’s murky political terrain’\textsuperscript{33}. This transformation of the military from political physician to political patient was not necessarily conducted by the Nigeria’s murky


\textsuperscript{29} Ochonu, M., ‘Colonialism within Colonialism: The Hausa-Caliphate Imaginary and the British Colonial Administration of the Nigerian Middle Belt’, in \textit{Africa Studies Quarterly}, Vol. 10, Issues 2 & 3, Fall, 2008, pp. 95-127

\textsuperscript{30} \textit{Ibid}, p. 100


\textsuperscript{33} \textit{Ibid}, P. 274
political terrain alone, but also by the military themselves as they worsen the already precarious condition of the patient rendering her vegetative. Therefore, the military’s solution to the indigene/settler contestation in Jos Plateau was to create Jos North Local Government perceivably to assuage the grievances of the Muslims Hausa/Fulani group. This move further aggrieves the already tense situation which eventually erupted into violent conflict with the appointment of Alhaji Aminu Mato on April 12th, 1994 as Caretaker Chairman of Jos North Local Government Council by the federal military government. It is Suberu’s opinion that the overriding objective for the 1991 local government reorganizations was the concerted manipulation of the distribution and configuration of the new localities to favour the administration’s key members, advisers, supporters, or lobbyists.

The Three Security Threat Cycles (3-STCs) in the Plateau Conflict: Since we have narrowed down our conception of security to human security, it is important to emphasis the centrality of the freedom from fear and freedom from want in appreciating the three security threat cycles in the Plateau conflicts. This is because the entirety of the concerns of human security as adumbrated in relevant literatures shows the interconnectedness of environmental, food, economic, health, personal, community and political security. The point being made is that the clash of the two security conceptions occurred when emphasis is placed on protection of the state and its officials against putting citizens at the centre of security discourse. On a general reading of the relevant literatures on human security, threats to human security seem to be as terrible as they are endless. They include; military threats, war, organised crime, drug abuse, trade in human organs, trafficking in human beings, diseases, hunger, unemployment, crime, social conflict, political oppression, low standard of living, non-peaceful transfers of governmental powers, economic crisis, long-term environmental changes, de-humanisation, public health problems, social dislocation. Others also include; religious crises, environmental degradation, poverty, lack of development, landmines, small arms and light weapons, human rights violations, internal displacement, terrorism, AIDS, demographic pressures, diminished access to resources, conflict, ignorance, social and cultural deprivation, direct and indirect violence, lack of democracy, nuclear weapons, natural disasters, homelessness, inadequate health care, traffic accidents, state failure, migration, child abuse, an unfair international trading system.

and gender-based violence. According to the UNDP (1994) Report\textsuperscript{38}, the more localized threats can be understood in relation to the seven values of human security which include threats to: (i) economic security, (ii) food security, (iii) health security, (iv) environmental security; (v) personal security, (vi) community security, and (vii) political security. The report further identifies those threats that are of international dimension to include:

2. Growing disparities in global income leading to overconsumption and overproduction in the industrialized countries and poverty and environmental degradation in the developing world.
3. Various forms of environmental decay.
4. Drug trafficking.
5. International terrorism.

From the foregoing, threats to human security may arise not necessarily within the State, but outside the State boundaries that can confine government’s ability to address. In this regards, the difficulties could be that the threats are outside Plateau State or in the third instance outside Nigeria. This study identifies three directions from where threats to human security have coalesced in the Plateau cycle of violent conflicts.

**Threats within Plateau State:** The internal contradictions within Plateau State as demonstrated in the influences of both colonialism and the period under military rule laid the foundation for current security challenges in the State. While the Plateau State government has put in place measures to tackle some of the human security problems in the State, poverty is on the increase. In fact, the State government is reported to put the poverty level in the State at 70 per cent\textsuperscript{39}, and alarmed that poverty is a reality that is affecting Plateau State people\textsuperscript{40}. Secondly, the 2010 National Bureau for Statistics\textsuperscript{41} poverty measures, in terms of dollar per day, food, absolute and relative poverty, of the north-central geo-political zone shows that the zone is only better than the other north east and north west geo-political zone. Despite the challenge of meeting other aspect of human security in Plateau State, the State government had spent about N10 billion on maintaining the Special Task Force\textsuperscript{42}. And while lamenting further, the Plateau State government under Governor Jonah Jang was reported as saying; ‘if these huge resources were channelled towards the development of the State, the hardship faced by the people would be mitigated’\textsuperscript{43}.


\textsuperscript{39} Editors, ‘Jang Puts Plateau Poverty Rate at 70%’, *Leadership Newspaper*, February 24, 2012 (online version: [http://leadership.ng/nga/articles/17297/2012/02/14/jang](http://leadership.ng/nga/articles/17297/2012/02/14/jang) - accessed October 20, 2013)

\textsuperscript{40} Ibid


\textsuperscript{43} Ibid
**Threats from other parts of northern Nigeria:** The fact that threats for human security are not confined to Plateau State alone further compounds the problem of the Plateau conflicts in the sense that they can only contribute in fuelling the already bad situation. The crises of unemployment, illiteracy, poverty, inequality, corruption and bad governance in the country has provided the needed army for the proliferation of crimes in the society. General T. Y. Danjuma (rtd) recently expresses worry over the teeming number of youths roaming the streets aimlessly and on the high rate of unemployment that has worsened the already bad security situation in the country44. In fact, the UNDP 2013 Human Development Report notes that more than 70% of Nigerians are living on less than $1.25 a day. The situation is worst in States in northern Nigeria, which the National Bureau for Statistics in the 2010 poverty profile had shown to be the poorest in the country. The gist of the matter is that the security threats in these States have exacerbated the not so palpable conflict situation in Plateau State.

**Threats from within Africa, especially Sahel:** This third and outer cycle of security threat is evident from the involvements of foreigners45 in the Plateau conflicts. But again, the security threats in neighbouring countries, especially countries in the Sahel region tend to push people out in search of means of survival to places like Plateau State. The mass movement of foreigners into Plateau State has strained the resource capacity of the State and unduly interfere with her economy, and ultimately the desire to meet the human security needs of the people46. While reflecting on the involvement of non-Nigerians in conflicts across northern Nigeria, Albert47 observes, *inter alia:*

*The involvement of non-Nigerians in urban insurgencies in northern Nigeria is not limited to religious fundamentalism. They actively participated in the ethnic conflicts in this part of Nigeria especially when it involves Hausa-Fulani Muslim ‘hosts’ and their Christian dominated southern Nigerian Strangers living in their midst*48.

47 Alhaji Aminu Abdulkarim, the NIS Comptroller in charge of the command, made the disclosure in Minna, ‘NIS Repatriates 111 Illegal Immigrants From Niger’, *Leadership Newspaper*, leadership.nghttp://leadership.ng/news/020513/nis-repatriates-111-illegal-immigrants-niger
49 Ibid, p. 393
This perspective is limited in the sense that it fails to consider the involvement of these ‘non-Nigerians’ in other parts of northern Nigeria where they have killed, maimed, destroyed and razed down communities with impunity. Secondly, their targets and victims are not necessarily only southern Christians, but even Hausa-Fulani Christians and in the case of Plateau conflicts, they kill and destroy indiscriminately.

PROBLEMS

The question that this section seeks to answer is to determine whether the securitisation of the Plateau conflict has not complicated the situation by confusing the actual threats to human security. Also, this section has borne in mind the fact that the clash of security conceptions is heightened by the complex nature of security dynamics in Nigeria and across Africa. It is important to state here that the ability of the society to develop and satisfy the wellbeing and welfare of its citizens will greatly deescalate violent conflict and increase legitimacy of the government and promote loyalty, patriotism and obedience from the citizenry\(^\text{49}\). Therefore, citizen centred and economic programmes that are designed to promote development, when they succeed, can have positive implications on security\(^\text{50}\).

In discussing factors that are responsible to the clash of traditional security conception and human security conception on the Plateau, the problem of undue emphasis (in both policy and practice) on the pursuit of National/State Security to the disadvantage of human security is critical. The goal of national security is on the defence of the state and the regime in power from external threats. By contrast, the focus of human security is the protection of individuals against both violent and nonviolent threats to their lives and human dignity. Secondly, the limited reading of the problem of insecurity and its impact on national development, especially from a militarized prism alone, has itself constituted a serious problem. This denies our security managers the ability to effectively address some of the root causes of insecurity and threats to democracy. This tendency has roots in colonialism and the military rule in Nigeria and other countries in Africa.

Thirdly, the problem stems from the unaddressed problem of the large number of young persons, who could become potential recruit into the terrorist cells. These young persons suffer from poverty, unemployment, destitution, lack of education, or even, disillusionment after education and ultimately become frustrated and alienated from society. They therefore become ready to put their own and other peoples’ lives at risk by carrying out violent crimes in society. They see no one as being interested in them, and they, have no approval reference point anymore within the legitimate society. Therefore, organized criminal syndicates certainly finds them useful, and usually gives them help, protection, and


\(^{50}\) Ibid
an element of identification with an authority figure, but harnessing their aggressive and destructive drives for the benefit of their syndicates. Fifthly, the restrictive perception of the problem of crime prevention and the impact of crime on national development only from the law enforcement perspective has constituted a major problem.

**PROGNOSES**

Though the course is misty, the prognoses lay in a number of considerations, which include: Firstly, that Nigeria has shown commitment by ratifying (with or without domestication) international instruments\(^{51}\) which seek to promote human security thereby addressing the fundamental problem of over militarisation of security. Also important is the need for amending the provision of Section 6 (6) (c), CFRN, 1999 by making Sections 13-24, dealing with fundamental obligations of the government, fundamental objectives and directive principles of State policy and duties of citizens, justiceable.

Secondly, the critical role of the civil society in the promotion of human security is very important because they have through their activities complement or supplement the human security efforts of government agencies around the world. Civil society organisations have been identified as having the size and reach; comparative advantages; the willingness to address threats to human security that other groups overlook; the ability to address political threats to human security; the ability to address transnational threats to human security; and the ability to make a long-term contribution to human security. There is therefore need to strengthen the activities of civil society organisations in this regard, especially by creating the enabling environment for political security.

Thirdly, desertification, which now affects 40 percent of Africa, has been further exacerbated by climate change in recent decades, and also increases civil conflict among populations vying for arable land. Nomadic groups are constantly at odds with sedentary farmers, who often take up arms to prevent unwanted grazing. The Great Green World Initiative\(^{52}\) , originally envisioned by African leaders in the 1980s and 1990s, is a global response to the encroachment of the Sahara Desert into the savannas and farmlands of sub-Saharan Africa. The central idea is for this belt of forest to serve as a barrier against desert winds and thus revitalize soil to protect against land degradation. It will stretch across Africa, passing through eleven countries – Burkina Faso, Chad, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, and Sudan. They have all enacted, or plan to enact, the first stages of the program. Fourthly, there is also need for a permanent solution to the problem of drought, famine, desertification and ultimately food insecurity across Africa through redistribution of water from areas of surplus to drought affected populations, vying for arable land. Nomadic groups are constantly at odds with sedentary farmers, who often take up arms to prevent unwanted grazing.


\(^{52}\) http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Africa/2013/0430/Can-a-4-000-mile-wall-of-trees-stop-Sahara-Desert-s-drift accessed on 24/10/13
areas\textsuperscript{53}. Jauro\textsuperscript{54} specifically advocates that since the entire of Zaire Basin, the upper catchment of the River Niger and the Niger Delta are identified as areas of surplus water resources, there should be linkage of Zaire, Chad and Niger Basins. We believe that this would ultimately serve as response to the myriad of human security issues across Africa.

CONCLUSION

While security is central to human survival, the deployment of State security as response to the Plateau conflict has led to the relegation of human security concerns to the background. Therefore, as important as State security is, it is intertwined and cannot be separated from human security. Hence, the relationship can be seen as a dialectical one; State and human security can both fortify and undermine each other. Just as human security cannot be achieved in the absence of secure State and strong, effective but also accountable State institutions, so is State security a mirage in the absence of a welfare regime that guarantees peoples’ freedom from fear and want. Accordingly, in responding to threats to security in Plateau State, both State and human security conceptions must reconcile through deliberate people-centred policies and programmes to be formulated and implemented by the government and civil society.


\textsuperscript{54} Ibid