CHAPTER TEN

SOCIO-CULTURAL AND POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF NATION-BUILDING POLICIES IN NIGERIA

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INTRODUCTION

The partitioning of Africa at the Berlin Conference of 1884-1885 crammed disparate ethnic nationalities together to form countries for the selfish aggrandizement of the colonial powers. This created a fundamental problem for the countries so formed. These countries were mere political contraptions without national identities. In other words, they were and are still not "nations" in the European sense of nationhood. We can call them nation-states, that is, states in the process of becoming nations.

The European ideal model of a nation is a single people occupying a well-defined territory, speaking the same language, possessing a distinct culture and sometimes religion, belonging to a single race and shapes a common pattern of behaviour by many generations of shared historical experiences. James Coleman (1971) defines a nation as a large group of people who feel that they form a single and exclusive community destined to be or remain as an independent state.

In reality, a nation is a large group of individuals who have certain things in common but also differ in many ways but have a common destiny for the future. Secondly, it is a psychological unit, that is, it is a group of people who feel they constitute a unit, who feel they have many important characteristics and who believe that they have one destiny. A nation is a homogenous and unified group. It is a body of people who feel themselves to be naturally linked together by certain affinities which are so strong and real for them that they can live happily together and cannot tolerate subjection to people who do not share their ties.

Nation therefore, is essentially spiritual in character, a sentiment, the will of the people to stay together differentiating those who share it from the rest of mankind. It may therefore, be defined as a spiritual sentiment or principle arising among a number of people who share a common language, religion, history and tradition and having interest in political association and common ideals of political unity.

In this sense, no country in Africa fits into the definition of a nation. Instead, we have a bunch of disparate people lumped together by colonial fiat and forced to stay together in an unwilling unions. This has been one major problem in all African countries that has bred various ills, including nepotism, corruption and oppression of minority ethnic groups that has threatened these colonial creations. The major

preoccupation of the post-independence political leaders of Africa, therefore has been how to weld the various ethnic nationalities they inherited from the colonial masters into a unified nation devoid of ethnic sentiments and cleavages. This is the process of nation-building.

What is Nation Building?
Nation-building is the process of unifying and integrating hitherto unrelated ethnic peoples to have a common identity. In other words, it refers to the process of constructing or structuring a national identity using the power of the state. This process aims at the unification of the people within the state so that it remains politically stable and viable in the long run. Nation-building can involve the use of propaganda or major infrastructure development to foster social harmony and economic growth.

Originally, nation-building referred to the efforts of newly-independent nations, notably the nations of Africa, to reshape colonial territories that had been carved out by colonial powers without regard to ethnic or other boundaries. These reformed states would then become viable and coherent national entities.

Nation-building included the creation of superficial national paraphernalia such as flags, anthems, national days, national stadiums, national airlines, national languages, and national myths. At a deeper level, national identity needed to be deliberately constructed by molding different groups into a nation, especially since colonialism had used divide and rule tactics to maintain its domination.

However, many new states were plagued by "tribalism", rivalry among ethnic groups within the nation. This sometimes resulted in their near-disintegration, such as the attempt by Biafra to secede from Nigeria in 1970, or the continuing demand of the Somali people in the Ogaden region of Ethiopia for complete independence. In Asia, the disintegration of India into Pakistan and Bangladesh is another example where ethnic differences, aided by geographic distance, tore apart a post-colonial state. The Rwandan genocide as well as the recurrent problems experienced by the Sudan can also be related to a lack of ethnic, religious, or racial cohesion within the nation. It has often proved difficult to unite states with similar ethnic but different colonial backgrounds. Whereas successful examples like Cameroon do exist, failures like Senegambia Confederation demonstrate the problems of uniting Francophone and Anglophone territories.

Traditionally there has been some confusion between the use of the term *nation-building* and that of *state-building* (the terms are sometimes used interchangeably in North America). Both have fairly narrow and different definitions in political science, the former referring to national identity, the latter to the institutions of the state. The debate has been clouded further by the existence of two very different schools of thinking on state-building. The first (prevalent in the media) portrays state-building as an interventionist action by foreign countries. The second (more academic in origin and increasingly accepted by international institutions) sees state-building as an indigenous process.

The confusion over terminology has meant that more recently, nation-building has come to be used in a completely different context, with reference to what has been succinctly described by its proponents as "the use of armed force in the aftermath of a conflict to underpin an enduring transition to democracy." In this sense, nation-building, better referred to as State building, describes deliberate efforts by a foreign power to construct or install the institutions of a national government, according to a model that may be more familiar to the foreign power but is often considered foreign and even destabilising. In this sense, state-building is typically characterised by massive investment, military occupation, transitional government, and the use of propaganda to communicate governmental policy.

Approaches to Nation Building in Post-Colonial Nigeria

Over the past several decades, Nigerians have sought to build a stable multiethnic nation. However, nation building has been complicated by Nigeria 's tremendous ethnic diversity and uneven distribution of resources. Taking into account the mandate, institutional arrangements, and conduct of successive governments in Nigeria, this chapter identifies four approaches to nation building. These are: the authoritarian, inclusionary, exclusionary, and democratic approaches. The paper examines the limitations of each of these approaches and points to the notable absence of the democratic approach, which is crucial for the promotion of a stable multi-ethnic nation. In particular, the analysis centers on the application of the Federal Character principle, boundary adjustment policies, and revenue allocation formulas. Also of note is the establishment of the National Youth Service Corps and the quota system.

Theoretical Framework

Since gaining independence from Britain in 1960, Nigeria has been struggling to create a democratic nation. At the heart of the Nigerian problem is the complex ethnic configuration of the country. So far, the Nigerian federation has been plagued by instability. There have been coup d'etats, threats of secession, a civil war, and numerous outbreaks of ethnic violence (International IDEA, 2000; Maier, 2000). Despite these setbacks, Nigeria has not disintegrated. There have been vigorous efforts to design institutions that can promote democracy and national integration. This chapter maps out the approaches to nation building that have been pursued in post-colonial Nigeria and evaluates their relative success. Furthermore, it draws attention to the absence of the democratic approach to nation building, which is crucial for the promotion of a stable multiethnic nation.

To get a better picture of the nation building process in Nigeria, it is important to view the nation both as a political arrangement and as a cultural phenomenon that is tied to the development of the state (Brubaker, 1992; Tilly, 1975; Znaniecki, 1952). In Nigeria, however, the colonial power that initially laid the foundation of the Nigerian state also worked against the formation of a common national identity

(Mamdani, 1996). This initial lack of consensus has resulted in numerous political problems that have pitted one ethnic group against another. As such, nation building in post-colonial Nigeria has become a deliberate effort to create an imagined political community that will foster peace and unity (Anderson, 1991). Over the years, Nigerians have learned that peace and unity cannot be realized without proper political representation for all ethnic groups as well as the fair and equitable distribution of the national resources. Consequently, nation building has largely centered on designing institutions that structurally embody these ideals. These principles have been reflected in all Nigerian constitutions. Article 14(3) of the 1979 Constitution, for example, states that "there shall be no predominance of persons from a few states or a few ethnic or other sectional groups in the government or in any of its agencies." Article 15(2) of the constitution prohibits "discrimination on the grounds of place of origin, sex, religion, status, ethnic or linguistic association or ties."

The question for Nigerians is how to realize the principles outlined in the constitutions and thereby promote a stable multiethnic nation. EhieduIweriebor (1990) has identified six criteria for measuring the progress of the nation building process. These are: leadership, transportation and communication networks, economic development, national education, pedagogical nationalism, and civil society. Though his study outlines the successes and failures of the various Nigerian governments, it fails to explain why a particular type of government might fail or succeed in promoting nation building.

In his study of public policy and national integration in Nigeria, RotimiSuberu made a distinction between the "specific functional public policies on national unity on the one hand, and the broad political regimes and ideologies that invariably shape, constrain or inspire such policies, on the other hand" (1999: 7). The major national integration policies that have been pursued are regionalization, redistribution, symbolism, and regulation. However, Suberu is not convinced of the success of these policies. He concludes that "these policies have been characterized variously as poorly conceived, contradictory, ineffective, counterproductive and repressive, even if often well-intentioned. The result is that today, by general agreement or acknowledgment, Nigeria is in the throes of a huge and staggering crisis of national unity" (Suberu 1999: 83). While Suberu's sensitivity to the varieties of regimes and ideologies as well as their impact on specific national integration policies is commendable, his analysis fails to distinguish between the relative degrees of success or failure associated with each of the various governments. He generalizes failure and marginalizes success.

It is argued that the results of the nation building process vary according to the type of approach adopted by the government. Furthermore, the approach that a government is likely to pursue is contingent upon the nature of its mandate, its institutional arrangements, and its conduct. Governments can gain their mandate through military takeover or multiparty election. By their very nature, the institutions of military governments are undemocratic. As for elected governments, while their institutions are intended to promote democracy, poor designs can

undermine democracy. Most importantly, a government may conduct itself in ways that are incompatible with the nature of its mandate. An elected government may act in ways that weaken the rule of law and democracy, while a military government may respect human rights, promote reconciliation, allow limited political participation, and restore democracy. Given the significance of ethnicity in Nigeria, it seems to me that the most important issue with regard to nation building is whether the policies of the various governments and the institutions under which they operate are discriminatory toward certain ethnic groups (Nnoli, 1980). Discriminatory institutions or conducts undermine democratic values in a multiethnic country, whereas institutions and conducts that promote inclusion tend to support democratic values. Based on these assumptions, we can identify four approaches to nation building in Nigeria: authoritarian, inclusionary, exclusionary, and democratic.

Military governments tend to pursue an authoritarian or an inclusionary approach to nation building. The authoritarian approach is typical of military governments that conduct themselves in ways that are oppressive and discriminatory toward certain ethnic groups. Such an approach often leaves negative institutional legacies and, in the worst cases, contributes to the disintegration of the nation. In cases where the military government conducts itself in ways that support democratic values, I call the approach inclusionary. This approach is typical of progressive military governments.

Despite recurring problems of electoral fraud, all of the civilian governments in post-colonial Nigeria have gained their mandate through multiparty elections. In this sense, they have been democratic (Linz and Stepan, 1996). However, their institutional setup and the conduct of their leaders have not necessarily always supported democratic values (Diamond, 1988; Joseph, 1991). Often, their approach to nation building has been exclusionary. This approach ranges from cases in which the government is poorly designed and the leaders behave in ways that weaken democratic values, to cases in which the government is deficient either by design or by conduct.

The democratic approach to nation building refers to cases in which elected governments operate under inclusive institutions and the leaders behave in ways that strengthen democracy. This approach has the greatest potential for creating a stable multiethnic nation. Unfortunately, Nigerians have not yet successfully pursued this path.

The history of post-colonial Nigeria indicates clear differences in the mandate, institutions, and actions of the various governments. The first distinction is between elected civilian and military governments.2 Though the institutions of all the military governments tend to undermine democracy, they differ in their conduct. Despite their shortcomings, the governments of Yakubu Gowon, Murtala Mohammed/Olusegun Obasanjo, and AbdulsalamAbubakar conducted themselves in ways that promoted inclusion and democracy. Their approach to nation building came close to the inclusionary model. In contrast, the governments of Johnson Ironsi, Muhammadu Buhari, Ibrahim Babangida, and Sani Abacha further divided

the nation and undermined democracy (Alli, 2000; Iweriebor, 1990). To a large degree, they pursued the authoritarian approach.

As for the civilian governments, they differ in their design. The First Republic, led by Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, was a parliamentary system of government and a decentralized federation which emphasized regional autonomy. However, in terms of representation and territorial division, the federation was biased against smaller ethnic groups (Diamond, 1988). The second Republic, led by Shehu Shagari, was a presidential system of government and a centralized federation. It too was biased against minorities (Oyovbaire, 1984). The Fourth Republic, which was led by Olusegun Obasanjo, also fell short of an institutional arrangement that would improve the position of marginalized ethnic groups, despite repeated calls for decentralization (Ogunbanjo and Ayandiji, 2001). In addition, all three governments have been plagued by favoritism on the part of their leaders. Insofar as these governments have failed to adequately incorporate and represent the ethnic diversity of Nigeria, we can define their approach to nation building as exclusionary. What has been missing thus far is an elected government that operates under inclusive institutions and is led by people whose conduct promotes democratic values.

To see how the various approaches and governments differ in their contribution to nation building, it is useful to consider the operationalization of the principles of political representation and resource distribution. In Nigeria, boundary adjustment and the Federal Character principle have been the primary mechanisms for fostering these principles. The Federal Character principle is a vision and a mechanism for ensuring that no ethnic or sectional group is excluded in the conduct of the affairs of the country. Boundary adjustment refers to the division of the federation into various political and administrative units (see table 2). Since ethnic groups are clustered in specific geographic areas, boundary adjustment is a key mechanism for ensuring proper ethnic representation at the local, state, and federal levels of government. Furthermore, it has become a significant factor in the distribution of national revenue.

Authoritarian Approach

Governments that pursued the authoritarian approach to nation building typically violated the principles of proper political representation and resource distribution. Both the Ironsi and Buhari governments refused to create new states or Local Government Areas (LGAs). In fact, Ironsi tried to turn Nigeria into a unitary state. Buhari banned all campaigns aimed at the creation of new states and abolished all LGAs created during the Second Republic. Though there may be good reasons for ending the fragmentation of the country, these governments failed to address the grievances of the marginalized groups. Given the link between ethnic identity and voting behavior, their policies effectively allowed the three major ethnic groups to wield disproportionate power (Mackintosh, 1966). From the outset, the Ironsi government was pro-Ibo and hostile to the Hausa-Fulani people. Ironsi was brought

to power by fellow Ibo officers who overthrew the First Republic and assassinated its key Hausa-Fulani political leaders (Alli, 2000). Equally, the Buhari government was dominated by his fellow Hausa-Fulani people (Iweriebo, 1990).

The Babangida and Abacha governments allowed the creation of new states and LGAs and reaffirmed the Federal Character principle. However, they failed to make a positive contribution to nation building. Babangida created two states in 1987 and added nine more in August 1991. From May 1989 to September 1991, he created more than 200 LGAs (see table 2). These changes, however, failed to address the grievances of marginalized ethnic groups and, in practice, served to maintain the advantages of the Hausa-Fulani.4 For instance, the Yoruba state of Lagos, which is the most populous state, was initially accorded only fifteen LGAs. At the same time, the Hausa-Fulani state of Kano, the second most populous state, was given thirty-four LGAs (Suberu, 1999). Given the fact that electoral districts were drawn around LGAs, the new arrangement violated the population principle for electing members of the federal legislature. In terms of horizontal revenue allocation, states with fewer LGAs were also at a disadvantaged position. Not surprisingly, these changes led to violent protests by the Yoruba. Boundary adjustment was also employed to derail the democratic transition process. In particular, it disrupted the formation of political parties as well as the primaries, which required candidates to first seek nomination from their LGA before they could advance to the state or national levels. In October 1996, Abacha created six new states and announced the creation of 183 new LGAs. However, the process was chaotic and corrupt. Because of the oppressive nature and Hausa-Fulani bias of these governments, the boundary adjustments that they introduced made very little positive contribution to nation building.

The Babangida government extended the Federal Character principle, applying it to the composition of public commissions, governing councils of institutions of higher education, boards of companies in which the government had a majority share, and admission into Unity Schools. However, the expansion only gave the government more room for manipulation. In January 1991, for example, it introduced a new quota system for admission into Unity Schools. Under the new formula, 15 percent of the seats were filled on the basis of academic merit, 40 percent were evenly divided among all the states of the federation, 30 percent were reserved for students in the state where the school was located, and 15 percent were allocated on the basis of discretion.6 While the discretionary quota was intended to address cases in which highly qualified students were edged out because of tight competition and low quotas in their home states, in practice it gave the government extra resources to use as it wished-usually favoring one group and promoting patronage.

The struggle for fair and equitable revenue distribution goes back to the colonial era. The 1946 Phillipson Commission recommended that revenue allocation should be based on the principles of derivation and even progress. While the principle of derivation allocated revenue to the regions in proportion to the revenue they generated, even progress gave more support to poorer regions. This meant that

Northern Nigeria, which was territorially bigger, less developed, and presumably much more populated, would get a huge share of the national revenue. At the Ibadan Constitutional Conference of 1950, the HausaFulani demanded that revenue allocation should be based on population size, while the Yoruba upheld the principle of derivation. After the conference, the Hichs-Phillipson Commission recommended a solution based on revenue generation, need, and national interest.

In 1953, the Chick Commission endorsed the derivation principle but recommended that the federal government be empowered to make grants to regions that were experiencing difficulties. At the 1957 Constitutional Conference, a new revenue allocation formula was adopted, based on the recommendations of the Raisman Commission. It de-emphasized derivation and took into account: (a) population size, (b) the basic responsibilities of each regional government, (c) the need for continuity in regional public service, and (d) the importance of balanced development. A Distributive Pool Account (DPA) was created out of which Northern Nigeria would receive 40 percent, Eastern Nigeria 31 percent, Western Nigeria 24 percent, and Southern Cameroon 5 percent.7 Mining revenues were divided as follows: 50 percent for the region of origin, 30 percent for the DPA, and 20 percent for the federal government (Suberu, 2001). As the Nigerian federation became centralized, the problem of resource distribution began to be focused more on the details of formulas for vertical and horizontal revenue sharing. Vertical sharing refers to the allocation of revenues among the federation, states, and LGAs. Horizontal sharing deals with the distribution of revenue among the various states and LGAs.

In 1984, the Buhari government altered the vertical revenue sharing formula, which was 55, 35, and 10 percent of the Federal Account to the federation, states, and LGAs, respectively. The Buhari government created two federally administered funds designated for ecological problems and the development of mineral producing areas. This increased the share of the federal government by 2.5 percent at the expense of the states, dropping their share to 32.5 percent. In 1992, Babangida introduced a new formula for vertical revenue sharing. It allocated 48.5 percent to the federation, 24.0 to the states, 20.0 to the LGAs, and 7.5 as federally controlled special funds (Suberu, 1999). These changes effectively favored the Hausa-Fulani, who dominated the federal government.

In January 1990, following bitter complaints from the Yoruba, Ibos, and minority groups in the south, Babangida changed the horizontal revenue sharing formula.8 The new formula allocated 40 percent on the basis of equality of states, 30 percent for population size, 10 percent for social development, 10 percent for land mass and terrain, and 10 percent for revenue generation. In practice, these changes helped maintain the *status quo*. Though the Yoruba, Ibo, and the minorities in the South were pleased to see population and social development factors slashed, and the revenue generation quota increased, the Hausa-Fulani were compensated by the land mass and terrain quota. In essence, the government retained a biased formula while pretending to address the concerns of the marginalized ethnic groups.

Inclusionary Approach

Most of the institutional innovations in Nigeria have been made by progressive military governments that have pursued the inclusionary approach to nation building. In 1967, Gowon tried to create a more balanced federal arrangement by dividing the country into twelve states, six in the north with three each in the east and the west (see table 2). His immediate goal was to avert the Biafra War and, in the long run, to ensure that no single ethnic group would dominate the federal government. Boundary adjustment continued during the Mohammed/Obasanjo era. In 1976, the government increased the number of states to nineteen and divided the country into 301 LGAs. While there is a consensus that the three-region arrangement did not adequately represent all of the contending ethnic groups, boundary adjustment has often been criticized. The crucial question is, when does boundary adjustment cease to be a positive act? To a large degree, the success of boundary adjustment depends on the social legitimacy of the government that is redrawing the boundaries. Because of the inclusive nature of the Gowon and Mohammed/Obasanjo governments, the changes that they introduced were seen as genuine attempts to solve a very complex problem.

Another significant development in the effort to ensure proper representation is the introduction of the Federal Character principle. The concept was introduced by Murtala Mohammed during his address to the Constitutional Drafting Committee in October 1975. He appealed to members of the committee to carefully consider the adoption of an executive presidential system in which the president, vice-president, and members of cabinet would be elected or selected in a manner that reflects the Federal Character of Nigeria.10 The idea was to devise an institutional arrangement that would ensure proper ethnic and sectional representation in government. Despite the constraints associated with consociational arrangements, the Federal Character principle has been crucial for promoting national integration in Nigeria.

The Gowon government watered down the principle of derivation in the formula for horizontal revenue distribution and reduced the proportion of the DPA allocated to the states on the basis of derivation. Fiscal centralization continued during the Mohammed/Obasanjo era. The 1977-78 Aboyade Committee recommended that all federally collected revenue should be placed into a single account of which 60 percent should go to the federation, 30 to the states, and 10 to the localities (Suberu, 1999). This arrangement, which was incorporated into the 1979 Constitution, strengthened the federal government and at the same time weakened the position of the states vis-à-vis the LGAs. To the extent that there was a need for greater regional integration and reduction of economic disparities between regions, the revenue allocation policies of these governments could be seen as positive steps in the nation building process. Indeed, they made good use of the financial resources by promoting reconciliation and undertaking vital economic and social development projects after the end of the Biafra War in 1970 (Iweriebor, 1990). However, they also left a legacy of fiscal centralization that later more biased governments could easily abuse.

Exclusionary Approach

In terms of ethnic representation and resource distribution, the record of the governments that pursued the exclusionary approach is mixed. The government of Abubakar Tafawa Balewa took a significant step in 1963 to adjust the federal structure. It created one more region, Mid-Western Nigeria, out of Western Nigeria. However, the restructuring did not balance the federation. In fact, it was seen as an attempt by the Hausa-Fulani to weaken the Yoruba in the western region. Boundary adjustment failed to address the hegemonic position of the northern region. Furthermore, it ignored the grievances of the minorities in the northern and the eastern regions.

Following the spirit of the Federal Character principle, the ruling National Party of Nigeria (NPN), led by Shehu Shagari, devised some structural arrangements to make the government of the Second Republic more representative of the country's ethnic diversity. As stated in Article 21 of the NPN Constitution: "zoning shall be understood by the party as a convention in recognition of the need for adequate geographical spread" (quoted in Iweriebor, 1990: 20). The party created four zones and pledged to fill its key political offices with people from all four zones." Even though the arrangement was a significant step in promoting proper representation, the NPN government failed to support it with practices that promoted integration. The government was plagued by corruption and Hausa-Fulani favoritism, which led to the loss of support from the people in the southern part of the country (Joseph, 1991). As it turned out, zoning was merely a strategy for winning the 1979 elections rather than a genuine commitment to diversity and fair representation.

After independence, the Balewa government continued the fiscal centralization that was championed by the Hausa-Fulani during colonial rule. In 1964, the government established the Binn Commission, which substantially increased the DPA and allowed the federal government to make annual block grants to the regions (Suberu, 1999). The shift from the derivation to the even progress revenue allocation principle under the Balewa government further embittered the Yoruba and Ibo people, who believed that they were contributing far more than what they were receiving.

Building upon the changes made by the previous military governments, the Shagari government increased the federal government's share of the national revenue and further watered down the derivation principle. The 1981 Revenue Allocation Act assigned 58.5, 31.5, and 10 percent of the revenue to the federation, states, and LGAs, respectively. In terms of horizontal revenue sharing, the act maintained the 50 percent quota for equality of states, reduced the population share to 40, and allocated 10 percent for land mass. In October 1981, the Supreme Court nullified the act after it was challenged by the southern states. The revised 1981 Revenue Allocation Act reduced the federal share to 55 percent and increased the share of the states to 35 percent. It also reduced the equality quota to 40 percent and eliminated the land mass share. However, it allocated 15 percent for social development and a mere 5 percent for internal revenue generation (Suberu, 1999). Though the changes

reduced the population quota, which traditionally favored the northern region, the loss was made-up by the introduction of land mass and social development factors.

The relentless changes to the formula for revenue allocation point to two kinds of struggles: one between the federal and state governments and the other between the Hausa-Fulani in the north and the people in the south, such as the Yoruba, Ibo, and Ogoni. The people in the southern states wanted to stop the concentration of revenue at the federal level. Furthermore, they wanted to uphold the derivation principle, which would allow them to retain a bigger share of the oil revenues. In contrast, the federal government, which has been dominated by the Hausa-Fulani until 1999, wanted to put more revenue at the center. Given the disproportionate concentration of mineral wealth in the southern part of the country, the Hausa-Fulani in the northern states were also pushing for the even progress principle.

The Democratic Approach

As mentioned earlier, a democratic approach is the best path to nation building in a multiethnic country. As we have seen in the Nigerian experience with nation building, it is difficult to pursue a non-democratic means of reform without provoking internal unrest and international condemnation. Unfortunately, the lack of a democratic mandate, poor institutional design, and bad leadership has all made it nearly impossible for successive Nigerian governments to pursue a democratic approach. As for the Fourth Republic, currently led by Olusegun Obasanjo, one can only be modestly optimistic. To begin with, many Nigerians are not satisfied with the 1999 Constitution of the Fourth Republic. It failed to address the structural imbalance of the federation. Given his resistance to the call for a National Conference, it is clear that Obsanjo is dodging the problem. Furthermore, he has not made any commitment to the recommendations of the Presidential Committee on the Review of the 1999 Constitution, which called for decentralization and greater protection of minority rights. Even more troublesome is the lack of accountability, the poor state of the economy, the ethnicization of the government in favor of the Yoruba elite, and the fraud that characterized the 2003 presidential election, which returned Obasanjo to power. In a chilling reminder of the fate of the Second Republic, Dr. RotimiSuberu warns, "If we continue to have these same levels of corruption and the economy is mismanaged, and then the sustainability of democracy will be reduced. The country's survival will be endangered."12 Even though the emerging domestic and international political environment has minimized the possibility of a return to military rule, there is a real danger of democratic decay in Nigeria. As we have seen over the past decades, democratic decay is a recipe for chaos and military intervention.

It must be emphasized that the real choice here is not between military and elected governments. Though the inclusionary approach of the progressive military government made some contributions to nation building, this approach has been seriously undermined by the lack of a democratic mandate. At best, it can only play a transitional role. The real question is: how can democratically elected governments

promote nation building? I have argued that such governments must promote inclusion. This can be done by designing national institutions that are much more representative of the various ethnic groups and by promoting a political culture that inculcates tolerance and inclusion. Among other things, Nigeria needs a simplified and transparent mechanism for boundary adjustment and a much more decentralized federation.

1.   There are at least 387 ethnic groups in Nigeria. The three biggest groups are the Hausa-Fulani in the northern region, the Yoruba in the western region, and the Ibo in the eastern region. Together, they account for around twothirds of the population, which is now over 100 million people. Other ethnic groups include the Annang, Efik, Ibibio, Oron,Tiv, Jukun, Ogoni, and Adoni. Traditionally, Nigeria has been divided into northern and southern regions. The southern region is further divided into eastern and western regions. Nigeria is also divided along religious lines, which tend to overlap with the ethnic and regional divides. The main religions are Islam, Christianity, and various traditional religions.

2.   The civilian governments are those headed by: Abubakar Tafawa Balewa during the First Republic (1960-1966), Shehu Shagari during the second Republic (1979-1983), and Olusegun Obasanjo during the Fourth Republic (1999-present). We should not forget the Interim National Government of Ernest Shonekan (August-October 1993), Olusegun Obasanjo, Yaradua, Goodluck Jonathan. The military government of Babangida aborted the Third Republic, which was to come into being in 1993. The military regimes are those headed by General Johnson T. U. AguiyiIronsi (January-July 1966), lieutenant Colonel Yakubu Gowon (July 1966-July 1975), Brigadier Murtala Mohammed/General Olusegun Obasanjo (July 1975-August 1979), General Muhammadu Buhari (January 1984-August 1985), Major General Ibrahim Babangida (August 1985- August 1993), General Sani Abacha (November 1993-June 1998), and General AbdulsalamAbubakar (June 1998-May 1999).

3.   As stated in Article 14 of the 1979 Constitution: "the composition of the government of the federation or any of its agencies and the conduct of its affairs shall be carried out in such manner as to reflect the Federal Character of Nigeria and the need to promote national unity, and also to command national loyalty thereby ensuring that there shall be no predominance of persons from a few states or a few ethnic or other sectional groups in the government or in any of its agencies." Furthermore, "the composition of the government of a state, a local government council, or any of the agencies of such government or council, and the conduct of the affairs of the government or council or such agencies shall be carried out in such manner as to recognize the diversity of the peoples within its area of authority and the

need to promote a sense of belonging and loyalty among all the peoples of the federation."

As a result of the artificialities of the various political edifices left by the departing colonial masters, Nigerian leaders faced an enormous task of nation building. The dimension of which are not only structural but there are also some problems emanating from our Economic infrastructure over which the nation is supposed to be built. This could further be confirmed by the aspirational gap existing among groups in the country.

As simple as the word nation appears to be, a fairly large part of it has become an up hill task. This is so because in the different areas of Social Science, scholars in their attempt to define a nation may mean other things when it comes to the real meaning of the word. This is not only due to different cultural, ideological and training exposures but also prejudice. Early European scholars claimed that the word "nation" is a European concept relevant to their economic, historical and political realities. Whereas where comparatively organized and cohesive human collectivities are found in Nigeria, they are described as tribes. It is their belief that even though these collectivities are cohesive, they are not nations. And to transform them into a nation, one has to adopt the strategy adopted by early European Nation Builders.

Recently, more empirically conscious scholars have given their own conception of what a nation is. One of such scholars is Karl Frederick who describes a nation as a cohesive group possessing independence within the confines of international order as provided by the United Nations which provides a constituency for a government which is effectively ruling such a group and receiving from them the support which legitimizes the government as part of the World Order.

Finally, the nature of this community of relationship needs not be the same in all countries. In some, there may exist a high degree of integration, while in others it may be loose. For example despite the diversity in Nigerian cultural traits, we still remain in the same country. The relative degree of the community spirit does not mean the measurement of the building blocks of the nation. It seems clear that the concept of a nation is relative and the building of a nation must also be relative and therefore an on-going process. This means in essence that there is no country where nation building is not a problem. This brings to us a conceptual definition of nation building, which is defined as generating among different collectivities, community culture, socio-economic and political infrastructures which enable most of its members to use their potentialities in a good way to benefit humanity and make for progress.

Problems of Nation Building in Nigeria

Having examined the concept of nation and nation building, let us analyze the problems associated with nation building in Nigeria. From the socio-political culture of Nigeria, leadership task has been and still remains one of the greatest problems Nigeria is facing in its struggle to build a nation State. To maintain unity in the new political system and create a unified society from the diverse groups in the country

and linked by that system for national development has been an up hill task to the leaders. As defined by the colonial power, the new leaders had to create a sense of national identity to replace the diversity of cultural pluralism.

Also, there was to be a new centralized political structure of authority to replace the colonial administration which was purely meant for their convenience and it often permitted wide areas of autonomy within a single political unit. The road to achieving the set goals was rough, making it difficult for the past and present leaders to achieve a marked degree of national integration.

Furthermore, the leaders have not been able to associate themselves with the nation and to share in the aspirations of the wretched masses. Rather their duties had been to accumulate wealth and enjoy with their families thereby neglecting their commitment and duties to the nation.

In the process of doing this, it is difficult for them to convince the masses of their sincerity and commitment to the process of nation building. Apart from this, the other problems which Nigerian leaders have faced emanate from themselves in their inability to remove themselves from past historical antecedence. Some of them face the problem of acceptability by the people and this is an obstacle to the creation of a true nation.

The problem of integration or nation building is not new to ex-colonial states, e.g. Nigeria. Other countries in Europe face the same problem. Nations such as Canada, Belgium, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia are all faced with the political implications where cultural pluralism is too powerful to be contained in a united nation. However, for leaders of new states such as Nigeria, the problems are particularly complex, looking at the diversity in our cultural traits and parochial tendencies linked with each tribe. The idea of the central administration being controlled by the local population instead of external forces imposes great strain on the process of nation building. Rapid readjustment must be made and new relationship established before leaders of separate groups can learn to cooperate in running the new national machinery.

It is an unhappy observation that wider political participation and contacts between previously separate groups does not help in nation building, rather, it hinders consensus and cooperation by increasing the sense of difference. In addition to a general interest in material welfare, individuals are also motivated by the need for a strong sense of identity. In new states such as Nigeria, this sense of identity is usually very strong and often associated with cultural pluralism of religion, tribe and languages. So while national unification and its greater economic efficiency may reinforce interest in material welfare, the threat to nationalism by traditional cultural loyalties may arouse an adverse reaction to the process of nation building. An individual may fear that either he will lose his sense of identity to a society which he does not feel strongly attached to or that someone else's culture and political interest may prevail over his.

Some of these fears of losing national identity could be minimized through a good network of communication. This in essence means that national integration could also be enhanced through communication network. Communication as we

know implies traveling; exchange of goods, messages, opinion and facts and the means by which they are performed are varied. They include roads, railways, air transport, sea, efficient telephone system, radio, even satellite. For this to be used as vehicles of development implies consideration of their location, installation and subsequent uses. At the launching of 2nd National Development Plan (1970–1974) the then Permanent Secretary in the Federal Ministry of Economic Development described the building of major road network to link the different parts of the federation as the centre-piece of the country's infrastructural modernization.

The reason for this high priority given to communication has been justified by the introduction the Global System of Mobile Communications (GSM) in the country. This, coupled with good network of roads has increased interactions, business and marital interchange between people of different ethnic groups in the country. People in the different parts of the country now are eager to, travel around and know, live and work together with their fellow Nigerians. The provision of better road facilities would continue to enhance the achievement of this objective. This in turn would enhance our awareness of our common nationality.

It is possible to identify certain areas where policy decisions by the leaders of new states, that is, the pre-colonial states including Nigeria, are likely to generate conflict. The first of this is the policy towards the establishment of a national language as a symbol of nationhood. In many cases no single language exists in newly independent states apart from the language of the colonial power, which is often regarded as undesirable because of past association.

Nigeria has been perpetually in conflict with herself because of the choice of a lingua franca which resulted in infighting among the three major tribes in Nigeria, wanting theirs to become the official language. The attempts to impose a single local language on groups who are culturally different have been a major political issue in India, Ceylon, Burma, Ugauda etc. These are concrete examples of societies with similar or peculiar language problem as a threat to nationhood as it is the situation in Nigeria. In most African countries either the colonial language was maintained or a neutral language like Swahili was chosen as it is widely used in East Africa. We strongly believe that in order to avoid chaos in Nigeria, a neutral language should be adopted as our lingua franca. It is a pity and an irony of fate in the political history of Nigeria that members of the Constituent Assembly legalized three official languages in the 1989 constitution and this brought about some social upheavals in the country.

A second area of conflict common both in Africa and Asia including Nigeria concerns on policy regarding the replacement of employees of colonial origin with those recruited from the indigenous population. The choice of office holders in the civil service tends to be conducted in such a way that those elites from the same cultural group where the new leadership comes from seemed to be patronized. This may be the effect of a colonial system which gave special advantages to some groups in educational terms such as the southerners in the early 60s and this trend could also be seen with the Moslems in India and Ganda in Uganda. This is the product of the colonial stereotype where certain groups were regarded as being

suitable for particular jobs, such as in Nigeria where External Affairs Officers mostly come from certain areas of the country. This trend is also traceable to the composition of our armed forces where the top military brasses come from a particular section of the county. But after independence, appointments to replace colonial civil servants tended to be seen on all sides as part of the sharing of spoils and groups which missed out either by accident of merit or design became indifferent.

The third area is really an extension of the second, that is, the problem of equal or proper allocation of scarce resources in the country. In most new nations, the government itself is the largest single employer because of the absence of major or private industries. Furthermore, the leaders are committed to goals of rapid economic development which require heavy spending. As with jobs, decisions regarding priorities on state spending whether on schools, dams or co-operatives, agricultural ventures are often interpreted in relation to benefit a particular cultural group in the community will derive from it. Right from independence, this is the trend exhibited by Nigerian leaders within the Nigerian polity, where the allocation of resources to certain geographical areas is not on economic basis but based on sentiments and parochial mentality of our leaders.

Finally, the nature of problems of nation building varies from country to country as does the kind of solution offered. Apart from the problems discussed above which we regard as our major problems; there are others which we presume not broad enough to give much prominence to their significance. These problems such as the need for mass education, the problem of mass unemployment and low remuneration that results in lack of job satisfaction is eating deep into our developmental process and creating room for failure in all our ventures.

Education has been accepted as a cardinal point of any developmental take-off. This implies manpower development to provide necessary labour force, expertise and technical know-how. Even in non-industrial societies, education is important to broaden the minds of the people, awaken their consciousness to apprehend social issues and provide them with good leadership.

A number of solutions have been advanced to assist integration mainly in terms of building up the confidence of minority groups in the national political system dominated by the majority. This is a recurrent trend in Nigeria where all successive Governments have come up with some innovations to appease the aspirations of the minorities such as the creation of states etc.

But on the whole, the most important method of nation building in the new nation-states should be based upon the new political institutions especially the party structure and the general constitutional arrangement to incorporate the tenets of democracy where justice and fair play are demonstrated among the totality of that community. Again the establishment of national loyalties without eliminating subordinate cultures, such as the policy of "Unity in Diversity", politically characterized by "ethnic arithmetic" has allayed the fears of smaller groups being swallowed up by the larger ones.

Socio-Economic Development in Nigeria

One of the major driving forces behind the quest for independence in Nigeria in the 1960s was the belief that development would be a national follow up once the countries in the continent attained their independence. Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana aptly expressed thus, "seek ye first the political kingdom and every other thing will be added unto you". Many nationalists harboured the notion that once the citizens were given the power to manage their own affairs, they would so ably conduct the affairs of the country that development would naturally follow.

Regrettably development seems to have eluded us after many years of independence. Instead of resigning ourselves to the fate that under-development is a permanent and not a transitory feature in Africa generally and Nigeria in particular, we may need a re-examination of the course of events. This lecture will re-examine our concept of development, the policies for nation building and why we failed to achieve development.

Early Concept of Development

One of the major forces that propelled early nationalists struggle for an independent Nigeria was the desire to develop their nation. The nationalist had evidences of how the colonial power was exploiting the resources of their country. They equally thought that the colonial powers would not be interested in retaining their hold on them if they were not benefiting from their occupation of these lands. They therefore reasoned that if all the exploitable resources were to be properly utilized by the indigenes in the development of the nation, there was no way they could not achieve development.

Because of Nigeria's link with Britain, development was seen within the framework of the British political system of government. The nationalists conceived of development in material terms. Their model was the western industrialized nations and they wanted their nations to be like the rich industrialized nations of the western world. Thus, it would be seen that as soon as independence was granted many of these countries embarked on ambitious policies for elaborate construction of road networks, industries and social services such as schools, hospitals, water and electricity supply schemes.

What is notable here is that the nationalists who took over power from the departing colonialists saw development in the mould of what obtained in Europe and the United States. They did not see it as something that needs to be appraised from within. The more the social scientists of the independence era criticized this narrow forms and limited vision of development, the more nationalist teachers pressed on to the idea. This wrong conception of development has severely affected the quality of life of the people. The people seem more and more disenchanted whilst the gap between the developed and the developing worlds is widening rather than narrowing.

Nigerian National Development Policies

On the attainment of independence in 1960, the Nigerian political decision makers saw the need to fulfill their election pledges. They realized that the colonial rulers had been very conservative in providing the necessary infrastructures for the poeple. Guided by their concept of development, they immediately swung into action. The Western Nigerian government introduced a free primary education scheme in 1954 and set in motion a wide range of other social reforms. The Eastern Nigerian government soon followed with a free education policy in 1957. This was, indeed, a major departure from the colonial policies. In fact today, we safely conclude that these free education policies greatly contributed to the development of skilled manpower for the country. Mboho (2022); Mboho and Nkob (2023) have stated the impact of free and compulsory education policy in Akwa Ibom State, including school feeding programmes which serve as social safety nets for children in Nigeria.

The independence of Nigeria heralded the introduction of a five year development plan (1960–1966) which has since become a feature of Nigerian development policies. The first development plan of Nigeria aimed at improving and expanding the educational system with a view to increasing production of high level manpower resources. It also aimed at expanding the agricultural base of the country, increasing the number of industries, providing for more infrastructure and social services and increasing the Gross National Product.

The 2nd development plan (1970–1974) also placed emphasis on agriculture, industry, transportation and education for manpower development. Because of the oil boom at the end of the 2nd development plan, the economy of Nigeria was buoyant. When the third development plan was launched from 1975–1980, the main focus was on equitable distribution of incomes and the control of inflation.

To invest the control of the Nigerian economy in the hands of Nigerians and to reduce the control of multinational companies (MNCs), the Nigerian Enterprises Decree was passed in 1972. This decree limited the economic activities of foreigner to only sectors of the economy which need huge capital investment. The decree also forced foreign investors to sell a stipulated percentage of their share capital to Nigerians. Again the decree tried to limit the employment of expatriates. The fourth national development plan (1980 -1985) emphasized structural changes with relative stability in domestic prices and the diversification of the economy.

Thus, the tendency of all the national development plans by government, both civilian and military has been to expand the agricultural base of the economy, produce high level manpower and improve and expand transportation. Evidently, there was a boom in construction, probably in highways, the flyovers, bridges, road networks of Nigeria in general, hospitals, schools, colleges, universities and a wider range of assembly manufactured products in Nigeria. However, we must try to distinguish between growth and development. These infrastructural expansion and social services which have helped in building the nation are indicators of growth but not of development. There can be no growth without development if there had been

no qualitative change in living standards of the citizens. Professor Dudley's assessment on the performance of the military in 1975 is relevant here.

If we were to take present income levels and correct for inflation, there can be no denying that the average citizen is today worse off than he was ten years ago. Today, successive administrations derive as income in a month what its predecessor, which it replaced earned in a whole year and this is really no hard evidence to suggest that the average man is now better off.

Failure in Achieving Development

It is worth emphasizing here that despite the expansion in social services, industries and infrastructure, there had been no meaningful development in Nigeria. Development is a multi-dimensional process which involves the totality of man and it should be seen in all spheres of man's life including his economic, political, psychological and social relations. Both civilian and military leadership placed a heavy emphasis on the economic aspect of development to an almost total neglect of its other aspects. For their zeal to make Nigeria to attain the level of development that western industrialized nations have attained, past governments have tended to devote time, energy and money to expanding the agricultural and industrial base and the production of high level manpower, among others. There has been absence of any consideration to improvement of a stable political culture and of the quality of life of the society. According to Mboho (2021), a number of reasons have been postulated for failure in achieving genuine development as discussed below.

On attainment of independence, the Nigerian political leaders adopted the Westminster system of Government. They failed to see that the Westminster system operates best in a particular environment and culture. They unfortunately adopted the system in environment which does not have the spirit for parliamentary debates and opposition. Thus, some members of the opposition soon began to contemplate on using violent measures to overthrow the government in power. Besides, some members of the ruling party in the cabinet refused to see anything good in an opposition in the legislature. They viewed with suspicion and contempt any suggestion from the opposition. This bitterness among members in government and the opposition did not allow the legislature to devote attention to mechanisms for the development of the nation. So leaders spent time chasing the shadow rather than the substance. Furthermore the Legislature tried to champion ethnic and sectional ventures. Political considerations greatly influenced the location of projects. The legislature did not mind twisting facts to favor areas which supported their political parties regardless of their suitability.

Secondly members of the government party felt it was their chance to acquire the status privileges of the colonial rulers and they did all they could to use their influence to win contract for which they have no skills to execute because of their selfish interests. This gave room for over invoicing and under invoicing of project imports and exports. Quality was thus sacrificed so far as the money flowed into their personal accounts.

Thirdly the top civil servants who had the technical skills and were in position to advise the politicians were themselves *tribalistic* and corrupt. Many of these civil servants aided and abetted rigging of elections, manipulated census figures, failed to implement projects because of ethnicity and falsified statistics of personnel available for the implementation of projects for the new political system.

Fourthly, though the military came into power with a view to correcting this trend of affairs, the concept of development was the enforcement of law and order and increase in the production of goods. Until the Buhari and Babangida regimes there was little effort to embark on civic and political education. Because of lack of legislative assemblies, the military relied heavily on top civil servants who were themselves not immune from corruption, ethnic rivalries and power struggles.

The Social Base of Nigeria Nationalism and the Problem of Nation Building

Just like in all other countries, the class that led the countries to independence was the Western educated elites. This class of rising "petite bourgeoisie of lawyers, doctors, teachers, journalists, clerks and businessmen were structurally" sand witched between the administration and commercial representatives of the European bourgeoisie on one side and on the other the peasants, labourers and wage workers of Nigeria.

In comparison with their Nigeria cousins, they were not poor. In fact because of their status and education, they were nearer or closer to the Europeans and thus had the opportunity to represent and liberate their brothers from the enslavement of colonialism. "But this position also rubbed into their skins the salt of the colonizers' contempt for the colonized. They became preoccupied with their own dignity, and their pursuit of civil liberties took primacy over national liberation.

This left the petite bourgeois Nigerians "obsessed with sharing the privileges of the white conquerors" and this further increased the "distance between them and the populace" and "their thirst to inherit the privileges of the whites … put severe distortions upon their nationalism."

Their search for jobs, education entrepreneurial opportunities and civil liberties resulted in their desire to trim down instead of throwing out the imperial order. They now sought to reform imperialism. "Rather than the liberation of the whole society from imperial relations, such men were quite happy to seek those civil liberties that would enable them to inherit colonial privileges and attain "civilized" status. This is the interpretation of the increasing privileges granted in successive colonial constitutions before independence.

In their quest for liberties they enlisted the support of the masses. They promised the people the creation of a new society and life more abundant. Thus, with the support of the masses, the colonial powers were forced to give them not only civil liberties but also some local power as well and they were persuaded that such local autonomy amounted to sovereignty. But in reality it was not sovereignty, since the states over which they were granted supervisory powers were still parts of the European imperial structure.

Thus, when independence finally came, Nigerian society was still tied to the colonizing power and the Western educated elites who were enthroned at the apex of the society became neo-colonial agents and exploiters.

The Perpetuation of One Party Rule in Nigeria and the Problem of Nation Building

During the struggle for independence in Nigerian, two principal classes could be recognized, the Western educated elites and the traditional rulers. Although these two groups had many things that divided them, and one thing was common to them – the dislike for colonialism. In Ghana, the long antagonisms between Nkrumah's CPP, the party of the (elites) new men, and the various alliances of traditional ruling class interests, who contemptuously referred to the CPP men as "veranda boys…" (Chinweizu) is a case in point. This conflict did not stop there, even among the compradorial class, and groups – the reformists and the radicals – could be recognized.

Consequently, three types of political parties could be identified in Nigeria. The party of traditional elites which rejected libertarian ideas and sought to perpetuate the *status quo*, the political party of the educated elites and professionals who aimed only at inherited privileges, and the political party of the radicals. The conflicts among these 3 sets of political parties after independence has validated Chinweizu's prophesy that "the competition between the traditional Nigerian elites and the petite bourgeois-elite would last beyond independence.

Today, each one of these groups tries to gain preponderance and then plant itself perpetually at the apex of the society. Thus, through merger or coalition, dissolution, absorption and suppression of opposition parties and through legislation or gansterism, single-party governments have been planted in Nigerian. Today, the All Progressives Congress (APC), popularly nicknamed "the largest party in Africa" by its leadership, has swallowed up other opposition parties and entrenched itself as the only party in Nigeria. In the on-going political dispensation, we witness mass cross carpeting of members of former opposition parties into the ruling All Progressives Congress. This portends doom for the opposition in Nigeria and a consequent loss of the checks and balances the opposition provides in government.

The following reasons account for the dominance of one party government in Nigeria.
1. The desire for politicians to remain in office and perpetually reap the rewards of public office. Political office holders find their salaries and benefits so many times higher than what they used to earn. For example, the general allowances, subsidized living (living at government expense) cock-tail parties, pomp and pageantry of office all make the politicians to be glued to their seats. The power of patronage is widely used by politicians to give out jobs, award contracts and to locate projects and the legacy of despotism created by colonialism has become very common in Nigeria today.

2.	At independence, there was the general belief that the political party that was instrumental to winning political independence should continue to lead the country in striving for development. This tendency led to the castigation of other political parties. The belief today is that the incumbent party should run more terms in order to complete the projects it started during its previous terms.

3.	In Nigeria, the tradition of having a government and opposition is not acceptable in reality. Therefore, opposition parties are seen as agents of sabotage and hooliganism instead of an alternative or shadow government.

4.	Ideologically it is wrongly believed that in Nigeria there are no opposing interest groups or classes in the sense of a bourgeoisie and a proletariat. Therefore, a single party could cater for the interest of a "homogeneous" society.

5.	Some Nigerian leaders argue that the drive towards modernization may dislocate Nigerian traditions and this may threaten stability. Therefore, in order to arrest such potential tension, charismatic leaders should organize single parties and compel obedience.

6.	When a political party wins election and forms the government, such a party acquires a certain privileged position vis-à-vis the losers. The party can grant or deny social amenities according to support for or opposition to the ruling party. Neglected areas and their leaders are therefore forced to cross-carpet into the ruling party in order to enjoy some benefits such as contracts, loans, jobs and projects, the ruling party endeavors to entrench itself in all facets of the society.

7.	The ruling political party enriches its party and party members through several manipulations and become better placed to mount aggressive electoral campaigns and to lure voters or to intimidate the opposition.

8.	The ruling party often, in order to entrench its rule, may attempt to instill the values which it represents into the entire population. In Nigeria, during the first republic, the NPC leaders made frantic efforts to Islamize the North and the entire country. They tried to impose a lingua-franca (Hausa), national dress, etc, and to establish a "Sardauna republic."

9.	The Western educated elites implicitly supported, and still support, the creation of one party system in Nigeria. They are in a position to fight for democracy, but due to their structural dilemma, they support the ruling government in order to get jobs, and sometimes they are barred from active participation in politics.

Moreover, civil service restrictions limit the bulk of the educated class to being book-keepers. Trade union organizations are often banned or their activities are tele-guided by the ruling party. The mass media are used as a megaphone for praising the government of the day.

Consequently, the ruling party becomes very secure in power and may stop to hold regular (elections), its organization may become personalized; electoral support is acquired through fraud rather than through canvassing for vote. Lip-service is paid to the ideals of democracy, justice, and the well-being of the citizens. Party system in Nigeria has been conditioned largely by the fact that it is an exotic phenomenon and was forced on Nigeria. The result is that elections have remained a sham and constitutional government an experiment, with democracy being mutilated by the ruling cabal.

In Nigeria, the greatest problem remains that of mass poverty and the domination of others by a particular ethnic group that has acquired political power ahead of others. Therefore, pressure groups ought to be organized and used as liberation movements. They ought to radically mobilize all the citizens, to create political consciousness and to act as a vehicle for social transformation of the society along broad based, popularly democratic and mass ideological lines. This is the expedient task of all organizations in Nigeria.

The Organization of Post-colonial Nigerian Society and the Problem of Nation Building

Post-colonial Nigerian society is a class-ridden society. It is a society where one class struggles with another for supremacy. In that struggle, the stronger class supersedes, suppresses, absorbs or totally eliminates the weaker class in order to perpetuate itself in office. In order to understand the problem of succession in Nigeria, one needs to trace the roots of the present Nigeria class structure.

In Nigeria, the present class structure is a creation and super-imposition of capitalist penetration and entrenchment. Thus, the evolution of class in Nigeria is slightly different from what Marx postulated. "Instead of capitalism being born of feudalism in Nigeria as in Europe, it was imposed from outside." (Keller). The opening of the colonial period met Nigeria with a matured form of communalism which expresses itself in the disintegration of tribal democracies and the emergence of feudal relationship, monarchical systems, etc. "Rather than destroying traditional modes of production and social relations, in many cases colonial capitalism utilized these structures to advance its own objectives " (Keller). The change was that foreign forces came to determine how the society was organized and functioned. The traditional rulers/aristocrats were turned into a chieftaincy institution modeled and used to oppress and exploit the masses at the local level on behalf of the ruling class.

The traditional rulers were used to dispossess the peasants of land and turn them into tenants or lease holders on land considered to be infertile by the white farmers. These landless Nigerians were compelled to sell their labour to the

colonialists. They thus underwent the process of *'proletarianization'*, and thus, the Nigerian proletariat class emerged. This created some element of contradiction in the Nigerian social order. This was further compounded by the rise of Western educated Nigerians. These Nigerians, because they were terribly indoctrinated with Western values, were co-opted into the colonial order as administrators.

Conditioned by a pro-Western miseducation, they see their class interest as tied to those of their imperialists masters, and they readily abandon the interests of their people to protect those of their class (Chinweizu, 1978:356), "Not owing their rise to the traditional rulers of Nigeria, and having quite been alienated from Nigeria traditions by their indoctrination in Western ways, these men felt no particular loyalty to the traditional rulers and their ways. (Chinweizu,86). This created a friction between them and the traditional rulers. But generally, they were not seen as enemies of their people.

In fact the concept of exploitation and class struggle was conceived as existing between the colonizers and colonized. But the role by Nigerian comprador elements in the process of exploitation of Nigerian was ignored and this obscured the indigenous exploiters as enemies of Nigeria. At the attainment independence, the smoke-screen was now removed to reveal them as the neo-exploiters (or Neo-colonial agents). Thus, colonialism did not only perpetuate traditional aristocratic class, but also created the proletarian and compradorial classes in Nigeria.

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